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randy e. barnett

Clauses Not Cases
Responding to Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and
Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/01/post_and_siegel.html.
In Questioning Justice, Robert Post and Reva Siegel make three claims. First,
that the Constitution authorizes the Senate to rest its judgment, in part, on the
constitutional philosophy of nominees to the Supreme Court; second, that this
practice is justified on grounds of democratic legitimacy; and third, that it is
best implemented by asking nominees “to explain the grounds on which they
would have voted in past decisions of the Supreme Court.” I agree entirely with
the first and, to my mind, most important of these propositions.1 I disagree,
however, that either the Constitution as a whole or this particular practice is
best justified on grounds of democratic legitimacy, or that their proposal is the
best way to assess the philosophy of nominees.
Like them, I view the inquiry into constitutional philosophy to be
grounded in the positive law established by this written Constitution that
allocates to the Senate the power to consent to judicial appointments. But I
view the legitimacy of any existing Constitution by which laws are coercively
imposed on nonconsenting persons to rest, in part, on the whether such a
constitutional order ensures that these laws do not violate the background
natural rights retained by the people.2 When a written Constitution meets this
standard, seeing that it is properly respected by the Supreme Court requires

1.

2.

I was on record about constitutional philosophy as a qualification for a Justice of the
Supreme Court in the context of the Miers nomination, see Randy E. Barnett, Cronyism,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2005, at A26, and even before in the context of the Roberts nomination,
see Randy E. Barnett, William Rehnquist, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at A28.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 11-52 (2004) (discussing constitutional legitimacy and the fiction of “We the
People”).
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that the President nominate, and the Senate confirm, only those who
understand, appreciate, and share this commitment to uphold the Constitution
as written.
A commitment to respect the Constitution is a matter of judicial character
or virtue that goes beyond the credentials that measure pure ability. If senators
are to assess judicial attitude as well as ability, then they must, as Post and
Siegel correctly observe, “acquire [the] useful information about a nominee’s
constitutional commitments” that is needed to make such an assessment.
Hence, in an example of what Cass Sunstein has called an “incompletely
theorized agreement,”3 we three agree, albeit for different underlying reasons,
that the Senate ought “to evaluate the constitutional commitments of
nominees, while preserving the independent integrity of the law.” Where I
disagree is how such information ought to be obtained. Post and Siegel
propose that Senators “ask nominees to explain the grounds on which they
would have voted in past decisions of the Supreme Court.” I have serious
doubts about the fairness and accuracy of their approach.
First, an inquiry into cases would risk turning hearings into a trial by
ordeal or, if that metaphor seems exaggerated, then an oral examination.
Unless there was a very limited set of canonical cases agreed upon in advance,
it would leave candidates open for ambushes that expose their understandable
lack of knowledge about any number of cases. While each senator need only
ask about just one or two cases, the candidate would have to take all comers or
look evasive or uninformed. I doubt whether many constitutional law
professors would be able to pass this sort of oral exam, but I am certain that
even a very able nominee would likely be unfairly tripped up by such a process.
Second, if we are to maintain our incompletely theorized agreement that
such inquiries are proper, whatever method is adopted to ferret out
constitutional philosophy should not favor any particular philosophy. Asking
about a set of canonical cases is biased towards a “result-oriented
jurisprudence” advocated by some, but rejected by others and perhaps even by
most. Why? Because a catechism that singles out particular beloved or despised
cases would effectively require candidates to pledge their fealty to the results of
the approved cases and their abhorrence of the despised ones. Even grounding
the “right result” on alternative grounds—the favorite pastime of con law
professors—could easily be characterized unfairly as a lack of proper
enthusiasm for the approved results, as was alleged about Robert Bork.
Regardless of the proffered justification, such a “test” would rest largely, if not
entirely, on reaching the results deemed correct, thereby effectively requiring a

3.
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“just so” constitutional philosophy that somehow manages to reach all the
right results.
This suggests a third problem. Such an inquiry privileges the status quo. It
takes as normatively given what Jack Balkin has called “the canon” and “anticanon.”4 But what makes “the canon” at any particular period a canon is solely
the prevailing attitude for or against some cases. Post and Siegel seem
implicitly to realize this when they refer to nominees “disclos[ing] their present
understanding of the law”—as though whatever canonical cases are presently
the law should all be accepted as equally binding.
Of course, their proposal would allow candidates to reject canonical or
accept anticanonical cases and take their chances, but given that the canon is,
by definition, widely accepted, any such course would be perilous for any
nominee. All can be expected to retreat to conventionally popular answers. So
what? Because it is a Constitution they are expounding—I have always wanted
to say that—not a set of canonical results. If applied faithfully in the past, their
procedure would likely have screened any nominee who questioned the
Supreme Court’s extant interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Clause in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania5 or its constitutional acceptance of Jim Crow in Plessy v. Ferguson.6
If you don’t like these examples, just think of any well-established precedent
we now think was wrongly decided. At one time it was canonical.
Indeed, it appears that privileging the status quo is inherent in Post and
Siegel’s account of legitimacy. Holding prospective justices to conditions of
“democratic accountability” seems to require their adherence to results in cases
that a majority of the public currently like or their rejection of cases that are
currently unpopular.
Happily, there is a better way of ferreting out a nominee’s constitutional
philosophy for all to see: Ask nominees about particular clauses rather than
cases. Knowing how they interpret a particular clause, even in the abstract,
would reveal at least as much about their constitutional philosophy. The
advantages of this approach are several. First, the Constitution is much briefer
than “the canon.” Even without a very hard-to-obtain prior agreement,
predicting which clauses will be asked about is much easier to predict, thereby
reducing the likelihood of unfair surprise.
Second, senators would need only inquire about a few clauses for all sides
to learn a great deal about a nominee’s approach to constitutional
interpretation. Consider the Second Amendment. Does a nominee rely on its

4.
5.
6.

See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV.
963, 1018 (1998).
41 U.S. 539 (1842).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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original meaning (and is the nominee aware of controversies about its
meaning) or does the nominee think its meaning evolves or has been
superseded by modern developments? Is its meaning one of general principle
or is it historically limited to particular practices in effect at the time of its
enactment? Does the existence of an individual right to keep and bear arms
preclude all reasonable regulations? Does it apply to the states? Why or why
not? Answers to these questions are likely to cohere with how a nominee
evaluates other clauses.
Because there is so little Supreme Court case law about the Second
Amendment, questions about this clause would tell us little about a nominee’s
stance towards precedent, which I think makes this topic all the more
appealing. A candidate’s view of the proper role of precedent could be gleaned
by asking about other clauses. Of course, examining the meaning of the Second
Amendment would be more abstract than asking whether a ban on so-called
assault weapons was constitutional. But that is its principal advantage.
Asking for untutored opinions about even canonical cases is worse than
misleading; it undercuts the proper humility we want nominees to bring to
judging. Particular applications of constitutional clauses are highly factdependent and real Justices inevitably rely on the advocates before them to
reach a considered judgment. Unless Post and Siegel expect nominees to study
all the pleadings in canonical cases, nominees will lack the crucial information
on which judges do and should rely, which is yet another reason why their
approach is impractical and potentially inaccurate. But all nominees should
bring to the Court their prior understanding of the meaning of the clauses they
are pledged to uphold, subject of course to revisions in their views of
constitutional meaning resulting from arguments by advocates before them.
Even if asking about clauses will not always get Post and Siegel all they want to
know about a candidate’s constitutional philosophy, it would get what they
need.
Let me briefly consider two likely rejoinders. Would not observers be able
to extrapolate some particular results from opinions of clauses? If applying
meaning to facts yields results, as it should, the answer has to be yes. Then
why not ask about results directly? Because doing so will be a much more
factually complex inquiry than is reasonably expected of nominees (or of
senators for that matter) and is likely to feed an explicitly results-oriented
constitutional philosophy. It would also tend to bind nominees to future
decisions to a greater degree than a clause-bound examination. On the other
hand, the fact that one can extrapolate some results from an inquiry into
particular clauses would permit those who are results-oriented in their
approach to the Constitution to use a clause-bound method to gain the
information they value and to make their results-oriented objections without,
however, unduly privileging their method above all others.
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Would not an inquiry into the meaning of clauses also privilege the status
quo by holding nominees to the current interpretation of clauses? To some
extent it would, but this is because the positive law of the Constitution leaves
judicial selection to the President and confirmation to the Senate, and both are
sensitive to majority opinion. So again, it is a matter of degree. Exploring the
more abstract meaning of clauses would allow more room for justices to admit,
after assuming the bench, that current case law is mistaken in some respect
than would a confirmation-hearing catechism of the canon. As evidenced by
the questioning of Robert Bork about the Ninth Amendment, I also think that
a discussion of the meaning of clauses in the abstract would better enlighten
the public on what all agree is relevant to judicial decisions: the meaning of the
Constitution itself.
Randy E. Barnett is Austin B. Fletcher Professor at the Boston University School of Law.
Professor Barnett is the author of Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of
Liberty (2004).
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